Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare Innovation: A Response to the FTC\u27s Report on Follow-On Biologics by Holman, Christopher M.
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 11 Issue 2 Article 12 
2010 
Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare Innovation: A Response to 
the FTC's Report on Follow-On Biologics 
Christopher M. Holman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher M. Holman, Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare Innovation: A Response to the FTC's Report 
on Follow-On Biologics, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 755 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol11/iss2/12 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
Holman CM. Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare Innova-
tion: A Response to the FTC’s Report on Follow-On Biologics. 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. 
2010;11(2):755-800.  
755 
Essays 
Maintaining Incentives for Healthcare 
Innovation: A Response to the FTC’s 
Report on Follow-On Biologics 
Christopher M. Holman* 
ADDENDUM—CHRISTOPHER M. HOLMAN, MAY 2010 
This article was written and accepted for publication prior 
to the recent passage of health care reform legislation. At that 
time, Congress was debating creation of an abbreviated mar-
keting approval pathway for follow-on biologics (FOBs). Al-
though there was broad support for the creation of some form of 
abbreviated FOB approval pathway, the specific contours of the 
proposed legislation proved to be quite contentious, resulting in 
the introduction of multiple competing FOB bills in both houses 
of Congress. The specific provisions of these bills varied dra-
matically. One of the bills in particular, House Bill 1427, was 
strongly opposed by the biotechnology industry, which instead 
supported the relatively pro-innovator House Bill 1548. By the 
time this article was written, elements taken from these bills 
had been merged into amendments to health-care reform legis-
lation then pending in the House and the Senate. 
Two of the most controversial aspects of the proposed FOB 
pathways were the data exclusivity period (DEP) and the pre-
approval patent dispute resolution process (PPRP). In June 
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2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) published a report 
recommending that Congress enact FOB legislation including a 
relatively short DEP (e.g., five years as provided in House Bill 
1427) and no PPRP (at that time all of the bills included a 
PPRP, although the specific provisions of the processes varied 
substantially between the bills). The FTC’s conclusion that a 
longer DEP (e.g., twelve years as provided in House Bill 1548) 
is unnecessary to adequately incentivize innovation in biologics 
was based in part on a misapplication of the results of a study I 
published in 2007 on the patent law’s written description re-
quirement. I wrote the present article in late 2009 in response 
to the FTC Report, explaining why I believe that the FTC over-
interpreted the results of my study, and arguing in favor of a 
longer DEP and inclusion of a fair and nondiscriminatory PPRP 
in any FOB legislation enacted by Congress. 
After the article was written and accepted for publication, 
Congress enacted health care reform legislation, including the 
FOB amendment pending in the Senate at the time this article 
was written.1 For the moment at least, Congress has chosen not 
to follow the FTC’s recommendations, and the FOB pathway 
passed into law includes a twelve-year DEP and a PPRP. How-
ever, this in no way renders moot the issues relating to DEP 
and PPRP addressed by the FTC Report and in this article. The 
PPRP for conventional drugs, provided under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, has been amended substantially since it was first 
enacted, and history suggests that the same will likely hold 
true for the recently enacted FOB PPRP.2 Expert panelists at a 
recent meeting of biotechnology patent attorneys identified 
numerous ambiguities and problems with the FOB PPRP that 
will likely necessitate congressional intervention.3 There is al-
ready an active campaign to amend the statute to substantially 
shorten the DEP for biologic innovators. Such an amendment is 
supported not only by the FTC, but also the generic drug indus-
try and others who believe a shorter DEP would bring down the 
cost of biologics, including influential members of Congress 
                                                          
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 119, 804–22 (2010). 
 2. See Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-
Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical In-
novation, 45 IDEA 165, 228–29 (2005). 
 3. Biotechnology Industry Organization IP Counsels Committee Confe-
rence, New Orleans, Louisiana (Apr. 19–21, 2010). 
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(such as the sponsors of House Bill 1427).4 Thus, the analysis 
and recommendations provided in this article remain highly re-
levant even after the passage of FOB legislation, as the focus 
shifts from passage of the bill to proposals for amending the 
legislation in a manner that lowers the cost of biologics without 
unduly dampening the incentives for innovation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congress is considering legislation that would create an 
abbreviated Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval 
process for follow-on biologics (FOBs), which proponents antic-
ipate will promote competition and lower prices in the market 
for biologic drugs.5 A key feature of such legislation would be 
provisions allowing an FOB applicant to rely on data generated 
by an innovator company to secure FDA approval to market an 
FOB (also referred to as a “biosimilar”) in competition with the 
innovator’s product. If the legislation works as planned, it will 
appreciably lower the cost and risk associated with bringing an 
FOB to market. Increased competition as a result of FOB ap-
provals is predicted to bring about lower prices but, will also 
result in loss of market share and price erosion for the innova-
tor, and potentially, loss of consumer goodwill. This could effec-
tively reduce the expected return on investment and thus the 
incentive for investment in the development of this increasingly 
important category of drugs. 
There appears to be broad support for the creation of some 
                                                          
 5. Biologics are essentially drugs produced in living cells, as exemplified 
by recombinant therapeutic proteins. FOBs are often conceptualized as ana-
logous to generic versions of biologic drugs, but due to the greater structural 
complexity of biologics compared to conventional drugs, true generic versions 
of biologic drugs are not anticipated any time soon. For a review of FOBs (also 
referred to as biosimilars), and the economic considerations motivating the 
push for legislation creating an abbreviated approval pathway for FOBs, see 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC 
DRUG COMPETITION 3–24 (2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
REPORT]. 
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form of abbreviated pathway for FOBs, but much debate as to 
the precise contours of the legislation. It is important that 
changes in the law to promote FOB market entry also provide 
adequate opportunity for biologic innovators to capture an ap-
propriate level of return on investment, so that lower cost bi-
ologics do not come at the expense of future innovation and the 
biologic drug pipeline. 
In June 2009 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pub-
lished a report on FOBs (“the FTC Report”), which attempts to 
forecast the nature of competition between innovator biologics 
and FOBs and offers a number of substantive recommendations 
regarding specific provisions of the various FOB bills.6 In par-
ticular, the FTC Report concludes that there is essentially no 
justification for the inclusion of a substantial data exclusivity 
period (DEP) for innovators in pending FOB legislation, and 
that Congress should not include a pre-approval patent dispute 
resolution process (PPRP).7 The FTC Report bases its conclu-
sion that a substantial DEP is unnecessary to adequately in-
centivize innovation in biologics in part on a misapplication of 
the results of a study I conducted on the written description 
doctrine of patent law.8 
In this article I offer a response to some of the conclusions 
and recommendations set forth in the FTC Report. In particu-
lar, I think it is important to clarify the scope and implications 
of my study on the written description doctrine, and explain 
why I believe that the FTC over-interpreted the results of the 
study to arrive at a conclusion that is unsupported by the data. 
As explained below, in my view an extended DEP for innova-
tors is justified and should be included in FOB legislation 
enacted by Congress. I also disagree with the FTC’s conclusion 
that a PPRP is unnecessary and unwarranted for biologic 
drugs; in my view, such a process is appropriate and would be 
important for maintaining adequate incentives for innovation. 
A fair and balanced PPRP would be especially important 
should Congress follow the FTC’s suggestion to provide only a 
relatively short DEP for biologic innovators. Some of the pro-
posed FOB legislation would discriminate against the develop-
                                                          
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at v–x. 
 8. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A 
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the 
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Holman, Lil-
ly]. 
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ers of innovative biologic drugs, not only with respect to FOB 
producers, but also in comparison to the treatment currently 
afforded conventional drug innovators. These discriminatory 
provisions should be removed or rectified to provide a more ba-
lanced approach to promoting competition, while still maintain-
ing adequate incentives for investment in biotechnology. 
As I write this I am aware of and have reviewed multiple 
FOB bills currently pending in Congress. House Bill 1548 pro-
vides a pathway that is relatively pro-innovator,9 and has been 
generally supported by the biotechnology industry.10 House Bill 
142711 and Senate Bill 72612 are essentially identical bills that 
would attempt to speed FOB market entry by severely curtail-
ing the intellectual property rights of biologic drug innova-
tors;13 not surprisingly, these bills have been strongly opposed 
by the biotechnology industry.14 More recently, FOB draft legis-
lation has been reported in the form of amendments to current-
ly-pending health care reform bills by the Committee on Ener-
gy and Commerce in the House, and the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) in the Senate (referred 
to hereafter as the “House Amendment”15 and “Senate Amend-
ment”16). The House and the Senate Amendments are based in 
large part on elements taken from House Bill 1427, House Bill 
1548, and, importantly, also on Senate Bill 169517 (an FOBs bill 
which was reported by the Senate HELP Committee during the 
                                                          
 9. H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 10. Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 68 (2009) (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan on behalf 
of the Biotechnology Industry Organization). 
 11. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 12. S. 726, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 13. Since the House and Senate bills are essentially identical, I will simp-
ly refer to the House bill, H.R. 1427. 
 14. Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 65 (2009) (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan on behalf 
of the Biotechnology Industry Organization). 
 15. Eshoo-Inslee-Barton Amendment of 2009, H.R 3200, 111th Cong. 
(2009) [hereinafter “House Amendment”] ( as passed by the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee on July 31, 2009 by a vote of 47-11). 
 16. Hagan-Enzi-Hatch Amendment of 2009, H.R 3200, 111th Cong. (2009) 
[hereinafter “Senate Amendment”] (as passed by the Senate Health, Educa-
tion, Labor and Pensions Committee on July 13, 2009 by a vote of 16-7). 
 17. S. 1695, 110th Cong. (2008). 
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110th Congress) — but each amendment also incorporates sub-
stantial differences, both in comparison with the originally filed 
bills and with respect to each other. 
II. FOB LEGISLATION SHOULD PROVIDE AN EXTENDED 
PERIOD OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR INNOVATORS 
All of the FOB legislative proposals provide a DEP for in-
novators. During the DEP, FDA will not be permitted to ap-
prove any FOB through an abbreviated process relying on in-
novator-generated data submitted to FDA by the innovator in 
order to gain marketing approval for the innovator’s approved 
biologic drug.18 If FOB legislation works as planned, the ability 
of an FOB applicant to rely on innovator-generated data will 
substantially reduce the cost of bringing an FOB to market. It 
is important to remember, however, that an FOB applicant 
could choose to generate its own data and forgo the abbreviated 
FOB pathway. The DEP would not prevent FDA approval in 
this case because the FOB applicant would not be relying on 
the data of the innovator.19 Furthermore, an FOB applicant re-
lying on innovator data would not be required to wait until the 
DEP has expired before applying for FDA approval. Under the 
current proposals, an FOB applicant would be able to submit 
an application relying on an innovator’s data, and the FDA 
would be permitted to review and tentatively approve the ap-
plication prior to the expiration of the DEP. Upon expiration of 
the DEP, the FDA would make the approval effective. 
House Bill 1427 would provide innovators a short five-year 
DEP,20 while House Bill 1548 would provide a minimum of 
twelve years of DEP, extendable up to 14.5 years for innovators 
that conduct pediatric studies of the drug and gain approval for 
a significant new use of the drug.21 The House and Senate 
amendments both provide a twelve-year DEP extendable up to 
twelve and a half years if pediatric studies are conducted. 
The FTC Report argues in favor of a relatively short DEP, 
less than twelve years, based on its conclusion that a twelve-
year DEP will not be needed to incentivize adequate innovation 
                                                          
 18. H.R. 1427, at § 3(a)(2). 
 19. Of course, there could be patent and other non-regulatory barriers 
that would delay FOB market entry. 
 20. H.R. 1427, at § 3(a)(2). 
 21. H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. § 101(a)(2) (2009). 
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in biologic drugs.22 A primary basis upon which FTC bases this 
recommendation is its conclusion that strong and effective pa-
tent protection will be available for biologics, comparable to 
that currently enjoyed by conventional small molecule drug in-
novators, thus obviating the role of data exclusivity in provid-
ing innovators with de facto market exclusivity.23 
In this section, I point out that if the FTC is correct in its 
assumption that patents will provide strong and effective pro-
tection for biologics, a 12-year DEP running concurrently with 
a patent term will have little impact on the timing of FOB 
market entry. However, it is far from clear that effective patent 
protection will be available for all, or even most, biologic drugs, 
in which case an extended DEP could prove critical in ensuring 
that biologic innovators are able to maintain a sufficient period 
of market exclusivity in order to adequately incentivize future 
innovation. 
A.  AN APPROPRIATE PERIOD OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY FOR 
INNOVATORS IS REQUIRED TO INCENTIVIZE FUTURE INNOVATION 
Bringing a new drug to market is a notoriously expensive 
and risky endeavor, and the requisite investment of time and 
capital will only occur in an environment that provides ade-
quate incentives. Although grant funding plays some role at 
early stages of discovery and development, the primary incen-
tive driving drug innovation is the innovator’s expectation of 
some period of market exclusivity in which to secure an ade-
quate return on its investment. Market entry by generic ver-
sions of the drug dramatically drives down the price of the 
drug, and inevitably the innovator’s profits as well. Competi-
tion by “me too” drugs in the same class can also reduce inno-
vator profits, albeit usually to a lesser extent than true generic 
competition.24 The optimal legal regime will balance the con-
sumer’s interest in timely generic competition with the recogni-
tion that innovators must be allowed to benefit from an ade-
quate period of marketing exclusivity during which they 
compete only against other innovator products, if any, in order 
to incentivize adequate investment to support the desired pipe-
line of future drug innovation. 
                                                          
 22. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 44–46. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 12. 
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As with any innovative technology, patents play an impor-
tant role in providing market exclusivity for drug innovators. 
However, drug innovators also face FDA regulatory barriers 
that operate to delay market entry for first-in-class innovators 
and subsequent competitors alike, placing drug originators on a 
more or less equal footing.25 In the absence of an abbreviated 
approval process, a competitor is required to generate all the 
necessary clinical and nonclinical data to establish the safety 
and efficacy of its product, which is very expensive.26 This ex-
pense is a potent barrier to market entry—one that the innova-
tor invested heavily in overcoming. An abbreviated approval 
pathway allows competitors to come onto the market without 
incurring the full impact of this expense. Thus FOB manufac-
turers have the advantage of substantially lower market entry 
costs. The significant role of regulatory barriers distinguishes 
drugs from most other innovative products, and is one of the 
reasons why competition and barriers to entry in the pharma-
ceutical market have been the subject of so much attention by 
Congress and the FTC. 
It is generally acknowledged that some substantial period 
of market exclusivity for innovators is necessary to incentivize 
an adequate level of investment in the development of new 
drugs. This is particularly the case for biologics. However, the 
actual duration of optimal market exclusivity has been hotly 
debated. For example, in a 2008 study, Duke University econ-
omist Henry Grabowski calculated that it takes between 12.9 
and 16.2 years on the market for a biologic innovator to “break 
even.”27 In response, Alex Brill published a critique challenging 
some of Professor Grabowski’s assumptions and estimating 
that seven years of data exclusivity would be sufficient to main-
tain adequate incentives for biologics innovation.28 Likewise, 
the FTC Report has criticized the numbers proposed by Gra-
bowski, arguing that the model used to generate the numbers 
“contains numerous methodological and conceptual weaknesses 
                                                          
 25. Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The 
Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 509 
(2007) [hereinafter Holman, Reverse Payments]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Date Exclusivity and the Bal-
ance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 
479, 486 (2008). 
 28. ALEX BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC 
BIOLOGICS: A CRITIQUE 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.tevadc.com/Brill_Exclusivity_in_Biogenerics.pdf. 
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that render its results too imprecise and non-robust to inform 
discussions about the length of an exclusivity period.”29 On the 
other hand, Vernon, Bennett and Golec, using contemporary 
models of risk and return from finance literature, determined 
that seventeen years of data exclusivity for new biologics are 
required.30 
One logical benchmark for setting the optimal period of 
market exclusivity for biologic innovators is the actual period of 
de facto market exclusivity currently afforded small molecule 
drug innovators. A recent study showed that small molecule 
drugs average eleven to thirteen years of de facto exclusivity 
prior to generic competition, primarily as a result of patent pro-
tection that typically extends well beyond the short DEP pro-
vided under Hatch-Waxman.31 The general similarities be-
tween the research and development, regulatory approval 
process, and market economics relating to the conventional 
small molecule and biologic drugs would seem to warrant com-
parable protection. Although the FTC may be correct in its pre-
diction that FOB competition will be less vigorous than generic 
drug competition (at least initially), biologic drugs are also 
more expensive and risky to develop and manufacture, and the 
two factors to some extent offset each other. There has also 
been a noted drop off in the approval of innovative conventional 
drugs in recent years, suggesting that perhaps the current pe-
riod of market exclusivity afforded small molecules might be 
sub-optimal for incentivizing innovation. The FTC Report spe-
cifically acknowledges that conventional small molecule drugs 
generally enjoy eleven to thirteen years of de facto exclusivity, 
and never suggests that biologic innovators deserve less protec-
tion.32 Instead, the Report simply assumes that patent protec-
tion will be sufficient to provide biologics with a substantial pe-
riod of de facto market exclusivity, thus rendering the DEP 
superfluous, an assumption I challenge later in this article.33 
In a related context, Congress has decided that conven-
                                                          
 29. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 45–46. 
 30. John A. Vernon et al., Exploration of Potential Economics of Follow-
On Biologics and Implications for Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 56–57, 71, 74 (2010). 
 31. See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, 28 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 491, 493 (2007). 
 32. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 43–45. 
 33. Id. 
HOLMAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/2010  2:51 PM 
2010] MAINTAINING INCENTIVES 765 
tional and biologic drug innovators should generally benefit 
from the same period of de facto market exclusivity. Under 
Hatch-Waxman, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006), drug innovators are 
permitted to extend patent protection for a drug in order to re-
store a portion of the patent life that is lost due to the time 
spent obtaining FDA regulatory approval, up to a maximum of 
fourteen years after the original FDA approval date of the in-
novator drug.34 This patent term restoration is available both 
for conventional and biologic drugs, and the same fourteen-year 
maximum period applies to both conventional and biologic 
drugs.35 
Similarly, the safe harbor from infringement liability pro-
vided by Hatch-Waxman for activities relating to the produc-
tion and submission of data to FDA applies to both convention-
al and biologic drugs.36 This consistent treatment of biologic 
and conventional drugs makes sense, in view of the similarities 
in the development, regulation and economics involved, and 
suggests that twelve to fourteen years of data exclusivity would 
be appropriate since it would guarantee a de facto period of 
market exclusivity for biologic innovators comparable to that 
already enjoyed by conventional drug innovators. The FTC Re-
port does not provide any compelling support for the creation of 
a system that effectively discriminates against biologic innova-
tors relative to conventional drug innovators. 
B. AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL NOT 
SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY FOB MARKET ENTRY IF THE FTC IS 
CORRECT IN ITS ASSUMPTION THAT PATENTS WILL PROVIDE 
EXTENDED DE FACTO MARKET EXCLUSIVITY 
The FTC Report predicts that strong and effective patent 
protection will be available for biologics, comparable to that 
currently enjoyed by small molecule drug innovators, and that 
it “is likely that few, if any, biologic products will experience 
FOB entry immediately upon expiration of a limited period of 
exclusivity.”37 The FTC Report even goes so far as to predict 
that patents will likely provide a longer period of de facto ex-
                                                          
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006). For judicial decisions applying the safe 
harbor provision, see Amgen, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 565 F.3d 846, 851 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095 
(N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 37. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 43. 
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clusivity for biologics than currently enjoyed by small mole-
cules.38 This prediction is based on the fact that the current 
FOB legislation proposals do not include incentives for chal-
lenging innovator patents, a key feature of Hatch-Waxman.39 
As explained below, for a variety of reasons it is by no 
means clear that patents will be able to provide the extended 
period of exclusivity predicted by the FTC. But let us assume, 
for the sake of discussion, that the FTC is correct in its predic-
tion that patents will provide effective protection for biologics 
comparable to that currently enjoyed by conventional drug in-
novators. If that is the case, then an extended DEP will not 
substantially extend the de facto period of market exclusivity 
for innovative biologics. The DEP usually plays no role in ex-
tending the market exclusivity of small molecule drugs because 
it has run out long before the relevant patents have expired. If 
the FTC is correct and patents provide de facto exclusivity to 
biologics for eleven to thirteen years, then a twelve- to fourteen-
year DEP will provide little if any extension to the effective pe-
riod of actual exclusivity. At times, the FTC Report apparently 
fails to recognize that the DEP would run concurrently with the 
patent term, and that the DEP only becomes relevant if and to 
the extent it extends beyond the period in which patents prec-
lude the entry of competition. 
On the other hand, an extended DEP could prove crucial if 
patents do not provide the effective protection for biologics pre-
dicted by the FTC. Even the FTC Report acknowledges that in 
some cases, effective patent protection might not be available 
for biologics, and that some biologic products may experience 
FOB entry immediately upon expiration of a limited DEP.40 As 
explained below, this might be the case even when a biologic is 
expensive and risky to develop, and the product provides sub-
stantial clinical benefit to patients. Even if this scenario plays 
out only rarely, a twelve-year DEP could provide important in-
surance for cases where effective patent protection is not avail-
able. There would be little downside to this because in cases in 
which patents are effective, the DEP will have largely, if not 
entirely, burned up by the time patents expire. The FTC Report 
explicitly acknowledges that to the extent innovative biologics 
                                                          
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id at 43, 45. 
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are not amenable to effective patent protection, an extended ex-
clusivity period may be warranted.”41 Because an extended 
DEP would only substantially increase de facto market exclu-
sivity in cases where patents prove insufficient, the prudent 
course would be to provide an extended DEP running concur-
rent with the patent term as insurance against those cases 
where patents prove insufficient. 
Furthermore, there are compelling advantages to relying 
more heavily on data exclusivity instead of patent protection to 
provide the optimal period of market exclusivity for biologic in-
novators. For example, by preventing market entry of FOB 
products for twelve years, much wasteful patent litigation could 
be avoided, since many of the key patents will no longer be an 
issue by the time the DEP expires. An increased reliance on 
DEPs could also provide critical incentives for the development 
of potentially life-saving biologics that, for whatever reason, are 
not amenable to effective patent protection. 
One of the unfortunate consequences of the current heavy 
emphasis on patent protection for incentivizing small molecule 
drug innovation is that many potentially meritorious drug can-
didates are never developed if an innovator is unable to secure 
effective patent protection for the molecule.42 In the past, bi-
ologic innovators have invested in the development of impor-
tant new drugs even in the absence of strong patent protection, 
relying on the regulatory barrier to market entry by competi-
tors to justify the investment. In a post-FOB regime, biologic 
innovators will likely be less inclined to invest in the develop-
ment of products for which they are unable to secure strong, ef-
fective, and predictable patent protection. An extended period 
of data exclusivity, however, could provide the needed assur-
ance of a reasonable likelihood of recouping and profiting from 
their investment. The requirements of patentability are such 
that it is very possible that effective patent protection will not 
be available for a pharmaceutically-useful biological molecule, 
but the molecule nevertheless would make a substantial con-
tribution to public health if developed and brought to market as 
a drug.43 An extended period of data exclusivity would provide 
an appropriate incentive to compensate for this limitation of 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 45. 
 42. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of 
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545 (2009). 
 43. Id. 
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patent law. 
 
C. THE FTC’S CONCLUSION THAT PATENTS WILL NECESSARILY 
PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY FOR 
BIOLOGIC INNOVATORS IS BASED ON ILL-FOUNDED ASSUMPTIONS 
Not all drug patents are created equal, and some have 
proven much more effective than others in blocking market en-
try by a competing product. Composition-of-matter patents 
claiming a drug active ingredient per se (“true COM patents”) 
are by far the most effective, and are the gold standard for the 
protection of conventional small molecule drugs. A true COM 
patent is generally impervious to being designed around, be-
cause it effectively precludes others from producing or market-
ing any product comprising the patented active ingredient. In 
addition, Hatch-Waxman requires a generic copy of a conven-
tional drug to employ the same active ingredient as the refe-
renced branded product.44 Even if a generic company develops a 
new formulation of the drug, a new process for producing or de-
livering the drug, or if it seeks approval for a noninfringing 
therapeutic use of the drug, it will normally be precluded from 
market entry until the true COM patent has expired. Most 
drug companies will only risk substantial investment in the de-
velopment of a drug candidate if true COM patent protection is 
available for the active ingredient. Small molecule active ingre-
dients are usually novel chemical compositions eligible for true 
COM patents that will generally withstand challenges to valid-
ity. For example, a recent market research report of generic 
drug patent litigation prepared by Bernstein Global Wealth 
Management (“the Bernstein Report”) reported that out of four-
teen total patent challenges involving a true COM patent, nine 
were won by the branded drug, three settled, and the generic 
challenger only won twice.45 
Other drug patents generally provide more attenuated pro-
tection for drug products, and experience has shown that small 
molecule drug innovators are far less successful in asserting 
                                                          
 44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). 
 45. AARON GAL ET AL., BERNSTEIN GLOBAL WEALTH MGMT., PARAGRAPH 
IV LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 6 (2007) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN 
REPORT]. 
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these patents against competitors than true COM patents. Ex-
amples of non-COM patents include patents directed towards 
specific formulations of a drug active ingredient, specific com-
binations of active ingredients, methods of using the drug to 
treat particular diseases, and processes and technologies used 
in the production of the drug. The Bernstein Report, for exam-
ple, found that of the twenty-three generic drug litigations 
identified in the study that involved patents claiming active in-
gredient combinations, oral modified release formulations, and 
first oral formulations, the branded company never prevailed in 
court, while the generic challenger won thirteen of the cases, 
and the other ten cases resulted in settlement agreements.46 
In particular, patents covering the technology and 
processes used to manufacture a drug tend to play an ancillary 
role in the protection of conventional drugs relative to true 
COM patents and even compared to other patents relating to 
drug formulations or methods of using the drug. In fact, pa-
tents on processes and technologies used in drug protection are 
not even listed in the Orange Book.47 The Bernstein Report 
takes the position that although patents on the processes or 
technologies relevant to a drug synthesis can be relevant on a 
case-by-case basis, they are uncommon, and thus not even cov-
ered in the report.48 
The FTC’s prediction that effective patent protection will 
obviate the need for an extended DEP appears to be based 
largely on an assumption that true COM patents claiming the 
biologic drug’s active ingredient (i.e., the therapeutic recombi-
nant protein) will prove just as effective for biologic innovators 
as they have been for conventional drug innovators.49 However, 
a review of the history of biologic patent enforcement reveals 
that true COM patents have been much less effective in pro-
tecting biologic molecules. 
The FTC Report acknowledges past instances in which 
                                                          
 46. Id. 
 47. See OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., APPROVED DRUGS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS 
(2010), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/eclink.cfm. 
This publication, commonly known as the Orange Book, identifies drug prod-
ucts FDA has deemed both safe and effective. 
 48. BERNSTEIN REPORT, supra note 45, at 18. 
 49. For example, the FTC Report finds that “[t]here is no evidence that 
the patents claiming the compound or molecule of pioneer biologic drugs have 
been designed around more frequently than those claiming small-molecule 
drug products.” FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 36. 
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competitors have effectively designed around a biologic COM 
patent, and provides two specific examples: 50 Genentech v. 
Wellcome51 and Hormone Research Foundation, Inc. v. Genen-
tech.52 Although these decisions are relatively old, dealing with 
two of the earliest biologic drugs to enter the market (recombi-
nant tissue plasminogen activator53 and human growth hor-
mone,54 respectively), they are nevertheless instructive as to 
the types of obstacles a biologic innovator could face in attempt-
ing to enforce a true COM patent against an FOB competitor. 
In both cases, the alleged infringer produced a competing ver-
sion of the same human protein, but with structural modifica-
tions, which effectively designed around the innovator’s pa-
tent.55 
All of the proposed FOB legislation would permit an FOB 
product to incorporate structural changes that distinguish it 
from the innovator’s reference biologic product while still tak-
ing advantage of the abbreviated approval process and refer-
ence to innovator-generated data. Thus, in principle, an FOB 
will be able to circumvent a patent covering the innovator’s 
product while still benefiting from use of the innovator’s data. 
The extent of the problem for biologic innovators will depend 
upon a variety of factors, including the scope of patent protec-
tion available for biologics, the amenability of the innovator 
molecule to structural changes that would avoid the patent 
claim while retaining similar functionality, and the level of 
stringency with which FDA applies its test for biosimilarity.56 
In any event, it is wrong to assume that biologic innovators will 
be able to successfully use COM patents to the same extent and 
as effectively as conventional drug innovators have in the past. 
After acknowledging instances where biologic COM patents 
have been effectively designed around, the FTC Report asserts 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 37 & n.152. 
 51. Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
 52. Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 53. Wellcome, 29 F.3d at 1558–59. 
 54. Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1560. 
 55. See Wellcome, 29 F.3d at 1555; Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1560. 
 56. Under the proposed FOB legislation, the opportunity to rely on inno-
vator data will only be available to an FOB that is “biosimilar” to the innova-
tor biologic, see, e.g., H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009), but it is uncer-
tain how stringent FDA will be in determining biosimilarity. 
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that in other cases COM patents have been successfully en-
forced against biologic competitors, and identifies six specific 
cases purportedly supporting this proposition.57 In fact, howev-
er, four of the six cases are off-point and do not support the 
FTC’s assertion.58 The two cases which support the FTC’s as-
sertion are Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd.59 and 
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.60 Both are recent 
district court decisions involving a family of related patents 
claiming recombinant and/or therapeutic versions of erythro-
poietin.61 At the time this is being written, Amgen v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel has not been affirmed at the appellate level, 
and the district court’s decision in Amgen v. F. Hoffman-La 
Roche regarding the validity of the asserted COM claims was 
recently vacated and remanded to the district court to consider 
whether the COM claims are invalid for obviousness-type 
double patenting.62 Notably, the FTC Report does not identify a 
single appellate-level decision finding a true COM patent valid 
and infringed by a biologic product. I have searched and been 
unable to find such a decision. In any event, there is scant em-
pirical evidence to support any inference that true COM pa-
tents are as effective in protecting biologic drugs as they are for 
small molecule drugs. 
Amgen’s recent success in enforcing its erythropoietin pa-
tents, at least at the district court level,63 is not typical. In 
many cases, biologic innovators have been unable to achieve ef-
                                                          
 57. FTC Report, supra note 5, at 37 & n.153. 
 58. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (re-
garding an interference contest between two companies involving no assertion 
of patent infringement); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (claiming a gene used in the production of the biologic, not the 
biologic drug); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008) ( involving patent validity and not addressing the issue of patent 
infringement); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (claiming the process for producing a biologic, not the biologic drug). 
 59. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. 
Mass. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 580 F.3d 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
 60. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. 
Mass. 2008). 
 61. F. Hoffman La-Roche, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 166–67; Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 62. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1386 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s judgment that the COM claims were 
infringed). 
 63. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 204, 229; Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
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fective true COM patent protection, often because the biologic 
product is essentially a recombinant version of a naturally oc-
curring human protein, and earlier isolation and characteriza-
tion of the human protein has created prior art precluding 
broad COM patent protection. This is normally not a problem 
for small molecule innovators, who generally will not invest in 
developing a molecule into a drug if there is prior art preclud-
ing true COM patent protection. For example, Amgen faced this 
obstacle with respect to recombinant erythropoietin, but was 
nonetheless able to obtain three COM patents limited to certain 
specific therapeutic and recombinant versions of erythropoie-
tin.64 It is also instructive to consider the difficulty Amgen has 
experienced in attempting to enforce its limited COM patents. 
In Amgen v. HMR, the asserted claims of two out of the three 
COM patents were found to be invalid or not infringed.65 Only 
after multiple appeals has Amgen apparently succeeded in con-
vincing the court that one of its COM claims is valid and has 
been infringed.66 
Most innovators that have brought groundbreaking biolog-
ic drugs to market have not succeeded in using true COM pa-
tents to protect their products. In some cases, they have only 
been able to secure patents claiming the processes and technol-
ogies used in the production of biologics, a more attenuated but 
nonetheless sometimes successful approach to protecting their 
product. In other cases, biologic innovators appear to have 
brought products to market in the absence of any effective pa-
tent protection, as suggested by the fact that competing prod-
ucts sometimes enter the market without provoking any law-
suit by the innovator who first achieved regulatory approval for 
the biologic product. In the absence of patent protection, these 
                                                          
 64. U.S. Patent No. 5,547,933 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 
5,621,080 (filed June 6, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,955,422 (filed Aug. 2, 1993). 
Erythropoietin is a naturally occurring human protein that was isolated prior 
to Amgen’s work, so patent protection on the purified protein per se was un-
available. See U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30, 1984) (summarizing 
various methods of purifying erythropoietin developed prior to Amgen’s clon-
ing of the gene encoding the protein). 
 65. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 457 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 66. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 210; Christopher M. Hol-
man, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey 
of the Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 329–30 (2007) 
[hereinafter Holman, Impact]. 
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products would likely not be developed in a post-FOB world un-
less Congress provides a DEP of sufficient duration. 
One of the most common means by which biologic innova-
tors have attempted to secure patent positions on their prod-
ucts is by patenting the genes, genetic constructs, and recombi-
nant cells used in the production of the biologic, as well as the 
processes themselves. In some cases, these patents have been 
deployed successfully (for simplicity, I will refer generally to 
these patents as “gene patents,” since they are based on the 
gene encoding the biologic rather than the biologic itself). Am-
gen has been particularly successful in using gene patents to 
block market entry by competitors in the market for recombi-
nant erythropoietin.67 However, there are also numerous ex-
amples where competitors have successfully designed around 
an innovator’s gene patents and brought a competing biologic to 
market while avoiding infringement liability.68 The FTC ac-
knowledges that the ability of drug competitors to design 
around non-COM patents is “prevalent,”69 a crucial concession 
when one recognizes that effective true COM patent protection 
has in the past often not been available for biologic innovators 
and that it is unclear whether things will change to render 
such protection more available in the future. Notably, the FTC 
Report fails to identify any basis for which to predict that true 
COM patent protection will be more available in the future 
than it has been to date. 
Another serious limitation facing biologic innovators rely-
ing on patents directed solely toward technologies used in the 
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Law-
suits Teach Us About the Role of Human Gene Patents in Research and Inno-
vation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 215, 223–29 (2009) [hereinafter Holman, 
Learning]. Examples include: Genzyme, Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, 
Inc., 346 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that claims broadly reciting me-
thods for recombinant production of human α-galactosidase A were not in-
fringed by a method employing gene activation technology); Biogen, Inc. v. 
Berlex Lab., Inc., 318 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that claims to cells 
that have been genetically engineered to express the human interferon gene 
were not literally infringed by cells produced using alternate transformation 
method); Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that a patent claiming a naturally occurring interferon gene was not in-
fringed by consensus interferon product); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that a patent on an insulin 
gene was circumvented by expressing protein as a fusion); Novo Nordisk of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding an appar-
ently broad gene patent circumvented by the use of protein fusion technology). 
 69. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 45. 
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production of the product is that these patents are potentially 
susceptible to circumvention by a competitor who produces the 
product outside the United States in a jurisdiction where the 
innovator has not patented the technology, or where enforce-
ment is more difficult.70 This could be an especially important 
issue if FOB production shifts to countries such as China and 
India, as some have predicted. 
 
D. MY STUDY OF THE LILLY WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT 
EFFECTIVE PATENT PROTECTION IS AVAILABLE FOR BIOLOGICS 
In concluding that effective patent protection is currently 
available for biologics, the FTC Report relies in part on the re-
sults of an empirical study on the Lilly written description re-
quirement (LWD) that I published in 2007.71 However, the FTC 
over-interpreted the results of my study to arrive at a conclu-
sion that I never stated, and which does not find support in the 
data. 
In considering the implications of my study, it is important 
to bear in mind the context from which my article arose. LWD 
is a distinct form of the written description doctrine which 
traces its origin to the Federal Circuit’s 1997 Regents of the 
University of California v. Eli Lilly decision.72 Prior to 2007 
there was a widespread perception, particularly among aca-
demics, that LWD functioned as a “super-enablement” re-
quirement that effectively limited inventors of novel biomole-
cules (particularly DNA and proteins) to a single sequence, or a 
limited number of specifically recited sequences, resulting in an 
extremely narrow scope of patent protection for biotechnology 
inventions.73 I conducted a search to identify all decisions in 
the federal courts and in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) which 
had applied LWD. My central conclusions were that: (1) LWD 
was generally not functioning as a super-enablement require-
                                                          
 70. Holman, Learning, supra note 68, at 229–31. 
 71. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 36–37 n.151 (citing Holman, Lilly, su-
pra note 8, at 47). 
 72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67 
(Fed. Cir.1997). 
 73. See Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 17. 
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ment, but rather was applied in a manner that effectively ren-
dered LWD redundant with the enablement requirement; (2) 
neither the courts nor the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
had formulated a coherent interpretation of LWD that provided 
any meaningful limitation on claim scope that could not better 
be achieved by means of the enablement requirement; and (3) 
LWD was not restricting inventors to claims encompassing only 
a small number of sequences; rather, inventors were successful-
ly obtaining and enforcing patent claims encompassing large 
numbers of variants of a disclosed invention, including newly 
discovered DNA sequences and proteins.74 
Based on the findings of my study, the FTC Report con-
cludes that since genus claims encompassing large numbers of 
variations on a disclosed DNA or protein sequence have sur-
vived challenges based on LWD, it must be the case that biolog-
ics are adequately protected by patents.75 However, this conclu-
sion is not supported by my article. The FTC Report fails to 
appreciate that the potential for a patent to effectively block 
market entry by a competing biologic is not merely a function of 
claim scope per se, but depends critically on the extent to which 
the structure of the claimed molecule can be altered while re-
taining substantial functionality. Even a patent that in abso-
lute terms covers a large number of variants will be ineffective 
in blocking FOB competition if it does not encompass all biosi-
milar variations of the reference product that could take advan-
tage of the abbreviated FOB pathway to market. I never ad-
dressed this issue in my article, and never suggested that my 
findings supported a conclusion that the scope of patent protec-
tion available for biologics would be sufficient to encompass any 
biosimilar variation of an innovator’s molecule. 
Although my article identified numerous judicial decisions 
involving LWD, only two of these decisions involved an in-
fringement lawsuit brought against the manufacture of a bi-
ologic. One of these was Regents of the University of California 
v. Eli Lilly (namesake of Lilly written description), in which the 
Federal Circuit applied LWD to invalidate the university’s pa-
tent claiming the human insulin gene.76 The other was Amgen 
v. HMR,77 in which the court sided with the patent owner and 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 78–82. 
 75. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 37–38. 
 76. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568–69. 
 77. See supra note 65–67 and accompanying text. 
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rejected the LWD-based validity challenge raised by the alleged 
infringer.78 However, in that case the LWD challenge was di-
rected specifically at claims reciting recombinant cells, not 
biomolecules (i.e., the actual biologic or the DNA encoding it), 
so the decision is not directly relevant to the question of wheth-
er patent claims broadly encompassing variations of a biologic 
or the DNA sequence encoding it, would survive a LWD-based 
challenge.79 The FTC Report specifically focuses on the availa-
bility of protein “percent identity claims” to protect biologics,80 
but my research has been unable to identify a single example of 
such a patent claim that has been successfully enforced against 
a biologic competitor. 
Perhaps more importantly, there have been significant le-
gal developments affecting LWD since the publication of my 
2007 article that could dramatically impact the ability of biolog-
ic innovators to obtain effective scope of patent coverage. Prior 
to 2007, my study showed that for the most part the PTO had 
applied LWD in a manner effectively redundant with the 
enablement requirement.81 When patent examiners attempted 
to use LWD as a super-enablement requirement to limit the 
scope of biologic claims, they were generally reversed on appeal 
by the BPAI.82 However, in 2008 the PTO issued revised writ-
ten description guidelines that in some respects contradict offi-
cial PTO policy reflected in the original written description 
guidelines that had been in effect since 1999.83 The revised 
guidelines apply LWD to biotechnology inventions in a manner 
that imposes substantial limitations on claim scope in a man-
ner that is distinct, and in some respects more restrictive, than 
the limitations imposed by the enablement requirement.84 This 
                                                          
 78. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330–34 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 79. Id. 
 80. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 36–37. 
 81. Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 71. 
 82. Id. at 78–79. 
 83. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
TRAINING MATERIALS 13–14 (2008), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM DESCRIPTION GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 27–
29 (1999), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/writtendesc.pdf . 
 84. Christopher Holman, PTO Issues Revised Written Description Guide-
lines, Further Muddying the Waters, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Apr. 24, 
2008, 4:01 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2008/04/pto-issues-
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applies particularly to protein percent identity claims of the 
type the FTC Report identifies as amenable to broad claim cov-
erage. Anecdotally, it also appears that the PTO has started to 
apply LWD more aggressively as a super-enablement require-
ment to claims on biomolecules. As a result, the broad seventy 
percent identity claims identified in the FTC Report are proba-
bly no longer available to most patent applicants, who will be 
forced to settle for a significantly narrower range of protection, 
ninety-five percent or greater in most cases.85 
A good example of this is the recent trend towards more 
stringent application of LWD to limit biomolecule claim scope 
can be seen in Ex parte Kubin, a recent BPAI decision that af-
firmed an examiner’s rejection of claims reciting DNA mole-
cules encoding proteins sharing eighty percent identity with a 
segment of a disclosed protein, and retaining the function of the 
disclosed reference protein. 86 According to the PTO, even 
though the applicant had enabled the genus of molecules en-
compassed by the claim, the claim failed to comply with LWD 
for failing to adequately identify which molecules sharing eigh-
ty percent or greater sequence identity retained the function of 
the reference molecule.87 This is a sharp departure from earlier 
BPAI decisions upon which I based the findings of my article.88 
Kubin signals that in the future, inventions relating to biologic 
drugs may be afforded substantially narrower patent protection 
than they have in the past, undercutting the FTC’s assumption 
that broad patent protection will be available for biologics. 
Quite recently, the Federal Circuit agreed to reconsider the 
doctrine of LWD en banc,89 and it is possible the court will cur-
tail, or perhaps even jettison LWD. But for the time being LWD 
appears to be playing an increasing role in restricting the scope 
of issued patent claims relating to biomolecules, and it could al-
so implicate the validity and scope of issued patents relating to 
biologics. It is also important to remember that my article was 
focused entirely on LWD, and there are a variety of other pa-
tent doctrines that could also substantially limit the ability of 
biologic innovators to secure broad patent protection capable of 
                                                          
revised-written-description.html. 
 85. Based on conversations with patent attorneys working in this area. 
 86. Ex Parte Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1412, 1417 (B.P.A.I. 2007). 
 87. Id. at 1414. 
 88. Holman, Lilly, supra note 8, at 42–57. 
 89. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 Fed. App’x 636, 637 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
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encompassing potential FOB products. In particular, even if the 
Federal Circuit decides to eliminate LWD, the enablement re-
quirement will still serve to limit the scope of protection avail-
able to biologic innovators. In recent years, there has been a 
renewed emphasis in the courts on the use of the enablement 
requirement to limit claim scope.90 
E. ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY AND LAW 
PERTAINING TO BIOLOGICS COULD CHALLENGE THE ABILITY OF 
BIOLOGIC INNOVATORS TO SECURE ADEQUATE PATENT 
PROTECTION 
Although the past experiences of small molecule and bi-
ologic innovators in using patents to maintain market exclusiv-
ity is informative, there are significant caveats that should not 
be forgotten. These include the changing nature of biologic 
drugs, uncertainty as to how far an FOB will be permitted to 
deviate in structure from a reference biologic while still main-
taining sufficient biosimilarity to benefit from an abbreviated 
FOB approval process, and ongoing (and at times dramatic) de-
velopments in patent law. Historically, most biologic drugs 
were essentially just recombinant versions of naturally existing 
human proteins (first-generation human proteins). However, 
the trend in biologics is towards extensively engineered va-
riants of naturally occurring proteins (second-generation hu-
man proteins) and therapeutic monoclonal antibodies. Past ex-
perience with the use of patents to protect first-generation hu-
man proteins will be of only limited use in predicting the ability 
of patents to adequately protect more recent and yet-to-be-
developed biologic drugs. 
For example, the nonobviousness requirement91 could sub-
stantially limit the ability of biologic innovators to effectively 
patent engineered variants of previously known human pro-
teins. Prior art disclosing the naturally occurring protein and 
the gene encoding the protein, combined with known methodol-
ogies for structurally engineering proteins to improve or modify 
function, could render a second-generation human protein ob-
vious under the patent laws, even if the product would be ex-
                                                          
 90. See, e.g., Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244 
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 91. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
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tremely expensive to bring to market and would provide pa-
tients with substantial benefit. Historically, it has been gener-
ally thought that the nonobviousness doctrine imposes a rela-
tively low barrier to the patenting of newly isolated genetic 
sequences and other biotechnology-related inventions. Howev-
er, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in KSR v. Teleflex92 has 
apparently raised the nonobviousness bar to patentability, and 
in its wake, pharmaceutical patent claims have been invali-
dated that would likely have survived and obviousness chal-
lenge pre-KSR.93 
The Federal Circuit recently affirmed a PTO obviousness-
based rejection of claims directed to a novel genetic sequence of 
therapeutic relevance, signaling that in the future patents re-
lating to biologics will face a more stringent interpretation of 
the nonobviousness doctrine than in the past.94 Rapid develop-
ments in molecular biology are constantly creating new prior 
art that could be combined by a patent examiner or court to es-
tablish the obviousness of an invention. In tandem, the accu-
mulation of prior art as technology advances and more strin-
gent application of the nonobviousness requirement could 
substantially restrict the availability of adequate patent protec-
tion for the innovative biologic drugs of the future. 
To date, monoclonal antibodies have generally been af-
forded relatively broad patent protection, and recently a jury 
found a COM patent claiming a monoclonal antibody infringed 
by Abbott’s biologic product adalimumab (HUMIRA).95 Howev-
er, again, there is a concern that the rapidly expanding prior 
art in this area, combined with a more stringent application of 
the nonobviousness doctrine, could preclude innovators from 
securing adequate patent protection on monoclonal antibodies, 
such as a monoclonal antibody directed against an antigen 
known in the prior art. Furthermore, although the PTO and 
courts have up until this point applied LWD and enablement 
requirements less stringently to monoclonal antibodies than 
                                                          
 92. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 93. See Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Lab., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (affirming based on the obviousness standard articulated in KSR); 
Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 571, 584–87 (D. Conn. 
2008) (invalidating claims based on the obviousness standard from KSR). 
 94. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (declining to 
adopt a narrow interpretation of KSR). 
 95. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 669 F. Supp. 2d 756, 
759–60, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
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other biomolecules, both doctrines are in flux, particularly 
LWD, and it is by no means certain that broad patent protec-
tion will be available to FOB variants of this increasingly im-
portant class of biologics. 
Some of the early biologic drugs were able to benefit from 
an extended term of patent protection because the patent appli-
cations were filed at a time when patents enjoyed a seventeen-
year term beginning on the date the patent issued. The law was 
changed in 1995, and subsequently filed patent applications re-
sult in patents which expire twenty years after the date the ini-
tial priority application was filed. Patents that were in force, or 
pending, when the law was changed were afforded a term that 
is measured as the longer of twenty years from the priority 
date or seventeen years from the date of issue. Amgen, for ex-
ample, holds several patents relating to its erythropoietin 
products which fall into this in-between category.96 This is yet 
another reason to question whether future biologic innovators 
will be able to employ patents as effectively as has been the 
case for the pioneering biologic products. 
Some biologic innovators not only benefited from a patent 
term of seventeen years from time of issuance, but also from 
continuation or divisional patent applications which were pend-
ing on June 6, 1995 (the date the change in law became effec-
tive). Patents issuing from these applications are entitled to a 
term significantly longer than twenty years from their priority 
date. Today, there are probably very few instances of patents 
issuing from applications that were filed before the effective 
date more than fourteen years ago, and it is safe to assume that 
new biologics coming to market will not enjoy patent protection 
beyond twenty years from the patent application’s initial filing 
date. Nevertheless, biologics companies today continue to rely 
heavily on continuation applications in attempts to obtain more 
robust (albeit not longer) patent coverage for their developmen-
tal products. 
In order to manage its workload, the PTO recently sought 
to institute changes that would substantially limit the ability of 
biologics companies to use continuation applications in this 
manner.97 Those changes have been challenged in the courts 
                                                          
 96. Holman, Impact, supra note 66, at 327. 
 97. See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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and are currently on hold,98 but it is too early to know whether 
some limitation on continuation practice might be instituted at 
some point, which could further limit the ability of drug com-
panies to obtain effective patent protection. 
The FTC Report argues that an extended DEP is not war-
ranted because it predicts innovators will use citizen’s petitions 
and other non-patent tactics to block market entry by the 
FOB.99 But under the FOB legislative proposals currently being 
considered, the FOB applicant is allowed to apply for regulato-
ry approval years before the expiration of the data exclusivity 
period, and during this time FDA should be able to address le-
gitimate citizen’s petitions and the like, while denying those 
that are mere pretense used as a delaying tactic. If a problem 
exists with abuse of the citizen’s petition process, that issue 
should be addressed by Congress and/or FDA, and not used as 
an excuse to deny biologic innovators a reasonable period of 
market exclusivity. 
III.  FOB LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE A FAIR AND 
BALANCED PRE-APPROVAL PATENT LITIGATION 
PROCESS 
Despite the FTC’s June 2009 recommendations, all of the 
pending FOB legislative proposals (House Bill 1548, House Bill 
1427, Senate Bill 726, and the House and Senate Amendments) 
include some variation of a pre-approval patent resolution 
process (PPRP),100 each more or less distantly related to the 
PPRP provided under Hatch-Waxman for small molecule drugs 
(often referred to as “Paragraph IV” litigations).101 However, 
the FTC Report recommends against the creation of a PPRP for 
biologics, based in large part on its conclusion that: (1) the pri-
mary justification for the inclusion of a PPRP for small mole-
cule drugs in the Hatch-Waxman Act was a concern that gener-
ic companies would be underfunded and effectively judgment-
proof, but that this rationale will not apply to the more estab-
lished biotechnology companies that the FTC predicts will be 
the primary developers of FOBs;102 and (2) provisions for pro-
                                                          
 98. Id. at 1359–62. 
 99. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 43. 
 100. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text. 
 101. The Hatch-Waxman PPRP is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006) 
and 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (West 1999 & Supp. 2009). 
 102. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 47–48, 57–59. 
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tecting the confidentiality of information exchanged between 
the innovator and FOB applicant are insufficient, and the ex-
change of information could facilitate anticompetitive collusion 
between competitors.103 In this section, I address both of these 
issues, and explain why a PPRP is important and justified for 
biologic innovators. 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that the importance 
of a PPRP is directly correlated with the length of a DEP pro-
vided to biologic innovators. A twelve- to fourteen-year DEP, for 
example, would deemphasize the role of patents in protecting 
biologics and consequently render the availability of a PPRP 
less critical. However, if Congress provides only a short DEP, 
such as proposed under House Bill 1427,104 a PPRP could prove 
crucial in order to ensure biologic innovators an adequate op-
portunity to effectively enforce their patents. It should also be 
stressed that any PPRP should not discriminate against biolog-
ic innovators, either with respect to FOB applicants, or in com-
parison with the rights afforded small molecule drug innova-
tors. 
According to the FTC, the PPRP for small molecule drugs 
was originally included in the Hatch-Waxman Act primarily for 
the purpose of protecting innovators from the possibility of 
judgment-proof generic infringers.105The FTC forecasts that 
this will not be a problem in the context of FOBs, based on an 
assumption that the damages resulting from infringement will 
be less than in the case of small molecule drugs, and because 
FOB manufacturers will be better funded and able to satisfy a 
substantial judgment.106 However, it is not entirely clear that 
infringement by an FOB will result in substantially less lost 
profits to biologic innovators than infringement by generic 
drugs cause for conventional drugs. Biologics are generally 
much more expensive to develop and produce than conventional 
drugs, and at this point it is hard to say to what extent damag-
es would accrue based on market entry by an FOB later found 
to be infringing, particularly if the judgment of infringement 
does not occur until years after the FOB has entered the mar-
ket. It is also unclear that FOB manufacturers will be in a sub-
                                                          
 103. Id. at 57–59. 
 104. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009). 
 105. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 47–48. 
 106. See id. at 53. 
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stantially better position to pay a larger award of damages 
than conventional generic drug companies. For example, econ-
omist Robert Shapiro recently published a report predicting 
that an FOB pathway for biologic drugs will result in huge sav-
ings for U.S. consumers, based in large part on his assumption 
that the production of biologic drugs will shift to low-cost coun-
tries such as China and India.107 Leaving aside the potential 
safety concerns associated with offshoring the production of bi-
ologic drugs to foreign companies competing on the basis of 
cost, these companies might also lack the financial resources to 
satisfy a large judgment if found liable for infringement subse-
quent to an extended at-risk product launch. 
But more importantly, there are other compelling justifica-
tions for a PPRP for drugs that the FTC Report ignores, includ-
ing the potential for irreversible price erosion and loss of con-
sumer goodwill if a competing drug enters the market prior to a 
determination of patent infringement. Prescription drugs, and 
particularly biologic drugs, are to a large extent paid for by 
third-party payers, according to complex formularies and nego-
tiated rates of reimbursement. In this environment, an innova-
tor unable to block initial market entry by an FOB competitor 
will suffer not only lost sales, but also faces substantial and po-
tentially irreversible price erosion and loss of goodwill. Absent 
some mechanism for initiating an infringement lawsuit prior to 
FOB market entry, the innovator would have no opportunity to 
convince a court to grant a preliminary injunction to avert this 
harm, no matter how strong the merits of the patent case might 
be. 
A. FOB LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE A FAIR AND BALANCED 
PRE-APPROVAL PATENT LITIGATION PROCESS 
The issue of irreversible price erosion based on premature 
market entry by a drug competitor was addressed recently by 
the Federal Circuit in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex.108 The issue 
on appeal was whether the district court was justified in enter-
ing a preliminary injunction barring a company from market-
ing a generic version of the drug Plavix®.109 The district court 
                                                          
 107. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO ET AL., THE POTENTIAL AMERICAN MARKET FOR 
GENERIC BIOLOGICAL TREATMENTS AND THE ASSOCIATED COST SAVINGS 7 
(2008), available at http://www.insmed.com/pdf/Biogeneric_Savings.pdf. 
 108. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 109. Id. at 1372–74. 
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had determined that the market presence of the generic prod-
uct would likely result in an irreversible erosion in the price 
that the innovator would be able to charge for its branded 
product, and that this erosion in price could not be reversed by 
an injunction ordering the generic product off the market at a 
later date.110 Even if the branded company were able to drive 
the generic product off the market, the district court found that 
third-party payers would resist going back to paying the higher 
price charged prior to the entry of the generic product.111 The 
court also found that the innovator would be irreversibly 
harmed by loss of consumer goodwill by customers who will 
grow accustomed to lower prices while the generic product is on 
the market.112 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s judgment.113 
Although Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex involved a small mo-
lecule drug, the rationale behind the court’s conclusion that ir-
reversible price reduction is likely upon market entry by a 
competitor applies with equal force in the market for biologics, 
where reimbursement is likewise dictated by the complex nego-
tiated relationships between drug companies and third-party 
payers eager to cut costs. Indeed, the whole point of the FOB 
legislation is to create competition that will force innovators ei-
ther to lower prices or to lose sales of their product to an FOB 
competitor. Thus, as in the case of conventional drugs, market 
entry by an FOB will often threaten irreversible damages to 
the innovator owing to price erosion. 
Not surprisingly, in a recent case involving a biologic drug, 
the court came to a similar conclusion when faced with the 
question of whether to enjoin market entry by a competing 
product. In Amgen v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, the district court 
                                                          
 110. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 342–43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 343. 
 113. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1385; see also Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, 
Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d 
at 1383) (affirming the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction and 
stating that “erosion of markets, customers, and prices is rarely reversible”); 
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingleheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s determination that testimony 
about the likelihood of price erosion and loss of market position upon market 
entry by a competing generic drug supported a finding of irreparable harm 
and entry of a preliminary injunction). 
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judge initially considered denying Amgen an injunction while 
the case was on appeal, in the belief that the availability of a 
competing biosimilar could benefit patients.114 However, upon 
further reflection the judge decided to enter the injunction, con-
cluding that even a short period of market entry by the infring-
ing product would result in irreversible harm to the patent 
owner Amgen.115 The judge also opined that the injunction be-
nefited the “public’s interest in a robust patent system that 
maintains incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.”116 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the injunction on appeal.117 
Market entry by an infringing FOB could also result in loss 
of goodwill for the innovator, for a variety of reasons. For ex-
ample, consider a scenario where an FOB has entered the mar-
ket for some period of time prior to a finding of infringement, 
but is then enjoined by the court from further marketing the 
product for the remainder of the patent term. It is highly fore-
seeable that some patients who have been using the FOB will 
strongly resist being compelled to switch over to the innovator’s 
product, either because of a perception that the FOB is some-
how superior to the innovator product, or simply based on an 
unwillingness to accept the risk that some subtle difference be-
tween the products could render the two products not entirely 
interchangeable. Even if there is no scientific basis to think 
that the FOB is in any way superior to the innovator product, 
the innovator will be in a very difficult position if patients 
plead for continued access to the FOB on humanitarian 
grounds. 
The recent case of Genentech v. Insmed appears to provide 
an example of this phenomenon.118 The patent owner prevailed 
in a patent infringement lawsuit against a competing biologic 
manufacturer and obtained a consent judgment that included 
an injunction requiring the infringer to exit the market.119 
                                                          
 114. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 209–
10 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 115. Id. at 210, 212 (finding that market entry by a competing biologic 
“would cause immense, immeasurable, irreparable harm, with the balance of 
the hardships falling on [the innovator],” and would result in “lost profits, 
market share, and goodwill”). 
 116. Id. at 210. 
 117. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 296 Fed. App’x 69, 70 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
 118. Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 119. Consent Judgment & Permanent Injunction, Genentech, Inc. v. In-
smed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 4:04CV05429), 2007 WL 
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However, a number of patients who had been taking the in-
fringing product complained vociferously that the infringing 
product was somehow more effective in the treatment of their 
condition than the innovator’s product, and launched a petition 
drive demanding availability of the infringing product in the 
United States.120 Note that there appears to be no compelling 
scientific basis for concluding that the infringing product is in 
fact superior, but faced with patient concerns an innovator 
company will often feel compelled to give in to public senti-
ment, regardless of the scientific merits of the case, both for 
humanitarian reasons and to maintain the goodwill of patients 
and doctors. In fact, faced with public pressure the patent own-
er, Genentech, agreed to a modified settlement permitting li-
mited distribution of the infringing product in the United 
States.121 
Of course, if a competing biologic truly does have superior 
properties relative to the first product to enter the market, it is 
important to facilitate early patient access to the best thera-
peutic available. But if in fact an FOB has significant clinical 
benefits compared to the original innovator product, the com-
pany producing the FOB should use the conventional FDA reg-
ulatory process to gain approval of its drug, including an FDA-
validated determination of the distinct safety and efficacy 
properties of its new biologic. The purpose behind FOB legisla-
tion is to provide improved access to biosimilar molecules that 
can be substituted for innovator molecules, not to provide an 
abbreviated pathway for the approval of different and allegedly 
superior biologics. 
Economic injury to an innovator resulting from market en-
try by a competitor due to price erosion and loss of goodwill 
might not only be irreversible, but also inadequately compens-
able by a post-judgment award of money damages owing to dif-
ficulties in quantifying the extent of injury. Although courts 
will sometimes award a prevailing patent owner lost profit 
damages, in practice, it will often prove difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the patent owner to satisfy the high degree of proof re-
quired by courts to substantiate an award of lost profit damag-
es. The patent owner bears the burden of establishing the 
                                                          
775609; Holman, Learning, supra note 68, at 233. 
 120. Holman, Learning, supra note 68, at 233 & n.117. 
 121. Id. at 233. 
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amount of damages,122 and courts often require patent owners 
seeking lost profit damages to provide a detailed and quantita-
tive economic analysis to establish the amount of profits that 
would have been earned in a hypothetical “but for” world in 
which the infringement never occurred.123 Judge Easterbrook 
has described in great detail the sorts of complex economic 
analysis required to support an award of lost profit damages.124 
Even if a court is convinced that the patent owner has suffered 
lost profits, it will often balk at awarding lost profit damages if 
unconvinced that the patent owner has marshaled “[sufficient] 
evidence from which a fair determination could be made as to 
the amount of profit plaintiff would have made.”125 
This could prove particularly problematic for a biologic in-
novator that has prevailed in a patent infringement suit, but it 
is unable to establish the actual amount of loss with a sufficient 
degree of economic rigor to satisfy a court. As noted by the 
court in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, market entry by a com-
peting drug is likely to result in large losses to the patent own-
er due to price erosion, but the specific amount can be extreme-
ly difficult to calculate with the required degree of certainty.126 
There are many examples where courts have denied a prevail-
ing patent owner lost profit damages because the court found 
the amount of lost damages requested by a patent owner was 
too “speculative.”127 This strict requirement of proof to establish 
lost profit damages could preclude a biologic innovator from ob-
taining adequate compensation for lost profits. 
Courts are particularly inclined to deny an award of dam-
                                                          
 122. See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1555, 1578–79 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that a plaintiff’s burden to establish 
lost profits is a preponderance of the evidence). 
 123. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 127. 
 124. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litiga-
tion, 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1383–85 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 125. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 
(6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). 
 126. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 342–43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 127. Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Damage 
awards can not be based upon speculation or optimism, but must be estab-
lished by evidence.”); see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 
952 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reviewing application of the “but for” standard); State 
Indus. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining re-
quirements for awarding lost profit damages); Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quin-
ton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that 
determination of actual damages may be difficult). 
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ages based on future lost profits, which could preclude ade-
quate compensation for a biologic innovator that has suffered 
irreversible losses due to the ongoing effects of price erosion 
and loss of goodwill.128 This would leave the innovator with 
nothing more than reasonable royalty damages, which will 
generally be far lower than the actual harm caused by FOB 
market entry. Clearly, it is important to provide innovators 
with an opportunity to gain access to the courts to attempt to 
obtain a preliminary injunction blocking market entry. This 
might be the only way for a biologic innovator to ward off the 
irreversible and incompensable injury resulting from market 
entry by an FOB later found to be infringing. 
It bears noting that none of the proposed FOB PPRPs 
would include a mandatory stay of the approval of the FOB. 
This is a key feature of the Hatch-Waxman PPRP, pursuant to 
which FDA will impose a mandatory thirty-month stay in the 
approval of a generic drug after a Paragraph IV infringement 
suit is filed. In contrast, the proposed FOB PPRPs would mere-
ly provide standing for the innovator to initiate an infringe-
ment suit. To block market entry by the FOB, an innovator 
would need to convince a court to enter a preliminary injunc-
tion, which would require a showing of reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits of the patent case, as well as equitable 
considerations weighing in favor of injunction.129 An innovator 
with a weak patent case would not be allowed to block market 
entry by means of a preliminary injunction, and an FOB appli-
cant facing an infringement suit of dubious merit would likely 
not be dissuaded from entering the market once the FOB appli-
cation has been approved. 
B. FOB LEGISLATION LACKING A PPRP WOULD DISCRIMINATE 
AGAINST COMPANIES DEVELOPING INNOVATIVE BIOLOGIC 
MEDICINES 
FOB legislation that fails to provide a PPRP would unjusti-
fiably discriminate against biologic innovators in comparison 
                                                          
 128. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1581 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court’s holding that determination of 
future estimated damages was speculative and reasoning that “[t]he burden of 
proving future injury is commensurately greater than that for damages al-
ready incurred, for the future always harbors unknowns.”) 
 129. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
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with small molecule innovators. In other contexts, the two 
types of drug innovators have generally been afforded equiva-
lent treatment. For example, Hatch-Waxman includes a regula-
tory approval exemption, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which exempts 
a generic company from patent infringement liability arising 
out of activities relating to generation of data for submission to 
FDA.130 This exemption allows a generic company to conduct 
the study necessary to secure FDA approval prior to the expira-
tion of the innovator’s patents, and thus be poised to enter the 
market immediately upon patent expiration. While this exemp-
tion limits the patent rights of the innovator, the PPRP pro-
vided under Hatch-Waxman provides balance by permitting the 
innovator to bring suit prior to market entry in order to resolve 
issues of infringement prior to market entry by the generic. In 
conjunction, the two provisions work to ensure that generic 
drugs can enter the market promptly upon patent expiration, 
but that innovators have the opportunity to block generic mar-
ket entry that would infringe their patents. 
Subsequent court decisions have established that the regu-
latory approval exemption is not limited to conventional drugs, 
but also shields activities relating to regulatory submissions 
made in connection with the approval of a biologic product.131 
Thus, FOB applicants already benefit from the regulatory ap-
proval exemption from patent infringement liability, so crea-
tion of a PPRP for FOBs would provide balance comparable to 
the balance that already exists for small molecule innovators 
and generic competitors. 
The FTC Report seems to assume that under the current 
system biologic innovators are only able to sue for patent in-
fringement after a competing product has entered the market. 
However, it is actually quite common for a biologic innovator to 
bring a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of 
patent infringement and an injunction blocking market entry 
by a potential competitor. The courts have allowed these decla-
ratory judgment actions to proceed based on the imminent 
threat of infringement established by the potential competitor’s 
application for marketing approval of its product.132 But under 
                                                          
 130. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006). 
 131. See Amgen, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 565 F.3d 846, 851 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Genentech, Inc. v. Insmed, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 
2006). 
 132. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 
1295–96 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. 
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the current system, there is no guarantee that a court will find 
the innovator has standing to bring a declaratory judgment ac-
tion, and there have been cases where such actions have been 
dismissed for lack of sufficient controversy to satisfy the stand-
ing requirement.133 Once an FOB applicant has applied for ap-
proval to market a competing version of an innovator’s drug, 
the innovator should be able to begin proceedings to resolve pa-
tent issues, and a PPRP would provide clarity as to when an 
innovator will have standing to bring such a suit. 
Generic companies routinely challenge small molecule drug 
patents with the expectation of having to litigate the matter 
prior to market entry; this is simply part of the cost of doing 
business in the industry. The FTC Report predicts that FOB 
competitors will generally be well established and well-funded 
biotechnology companies, the type of company that should be 
able to manage the cost of commencing litigation of patents 
prior to market entry.134 If they are not, they could be the type 
of judgment-proof company which the FTC Report would find to 
justify the availability of a PPRP. A PPRP that does not auto-
matically stay approval of the allegedly infringing product 
would not block FOB market entry unless a court determines 
that there is a substantial likelihood that the patent owner will 
ultimately prevail, thus ensuring that biologic innovators will 
not be able to game the PPRP by filing a non-meritorious in-
fringement lawsuit merely as a tactic to delay market entry. 
IV.  AN EXCHANGE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
WILL BE NECESSARY TO ASSESS INFRINGEMENT AND 
SHOULD NOT CREATE AN UNDUE OR UNIQUE RISK OF 
COLLUSION 
Because of the complex nature of biologics and biologic 
production, and the heavy reliance of biologic innovators on pa-
tents relating to the processes and technologies used to produce 
the product, it will be necessary for the innovator to have some 
access to information about the specific nature of the proposed 
FOB product and production process in order to assess whether 
infringement would occur. Proposed FOB legislation would in-
                                                          
Supp. 2d 160, 166, 229 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 133. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F.Supp.2d 
104, 111–13 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 134. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 53. 
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clude various provisions governing the exchange of confidential 
information, as well as provisions designed to limit access to 
the confidential information. In spite of these provisions to 
maintain confidentiality of proprietary information, the FTC 
Report voices concern that these safeguards will be insufficient 
to prevent an unreasonable likelihood that the data exchange 
could lead to collusion between the innovator and FOB compa-
nies.135 However, without this information it will be difficult in 
many cases for an innovator to assess whether an FOB product 
would infringe its patent. This is particularly true since, unlike 
a generic version of a drug, an FOB product could differ sub-
stantially from the innovator product and be produced using a 
very different process. 
The FTC’s concerns regarding the potential for collusion 
are probably overstated. Litigation, particularly litigation in-
volving technology and intellectual property, often requires 
some exchange of information between representatives of com-
peting companies, and methods have been created for minimiz-
ing the anticompetitive potential of these exchanges. For ex-
ample, some generic drug patent litigation involves patents 
claiming specific formulations or processes used in drug pro-
duction, and resolution of these cases necessarily requires some 
exchange of information between the competing companies’ at-
torneys. 
Even if there is no PPRP for biologics, biologic innovators 
will often be able to bring declaratory judgment actions to es-
tablish that marketing of the FOB would be infringing, and 
even if denied standing in a declaratory judgment action, they 
still will be able to bring an infringement lawsuit once the FOB 
enters the market. This type of litigation will likewise necessi-
tate some exchange of information, but there are safeguards 
that can be used to minimize the danger that this exchange of 
data will result in collusion. In recent years, the FTC has close-
ly scrutinized the activities of both generic and branded drug 
companies, and particularly their interactions with each other, 
and should be able to continue to do so, thus minimizing the po-
tential for anticompetitive collusion. In any event, the FTC has 
failed to articulate any rational basis for thinking that the ex-
change of information that would occur as part of a PPRP for 
biologics raises a unique potential for collusion that does not 
already exist with respect to the PPRP for conventional drugs, 
                                                          
 135. Id. at 58. 
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and with non-PPRP patent litigation in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and beyond. 
V. PPRP PROVISIONS THAT WOULD COMPEL 
INNOVATORS TO IDENTIFY AND ASSERT PATENTS 
PRIOR TO FOB APPROVAL ARE UNNECESSARY, 
DISCRIMINATORY, AND WOULD WEAKEN INCENTIVES 
FOR INNOVATION 
Some of the proposals, particularly House Bill 1427, in-
clude provisions that would seek to compel a biologic innovator 
to identify all patents that might be infringed by an FOB, and 
to assert those patents in a lawsuit against an FOB applicant 
prior to FOB marketing approval.136 Failure to identify a pa-
tent or to assert it in a timely manner would result in draco-
nian penalties for the innovator. These heavy-handed attempts 
to compel an innovator to bring a lawsuit prior to FOB market-
ing approval are unjustified, and would hurt innovation by se-
verely degrading the value of patents held by innovators. 
The provision requiring innovators to identify patents that 
could be infringed by an FOB are unfair and unnecessary. As 
noted in the FTC Report, patent information is freely available 
in the public domain, and an FOB applicant will have ample 
opportunity to identify and address relevant issued patents.137 
It is important to remember that by entering the market an 
FOB producer will be subject to lawsuits not only by the inno-
vator, but by third parties owning patents allegedly covering 
the FOB, or processes and technologies used in manufacturing 
it. These sorts of third-party patent infringement lawsuits, 
which do not involve direct market competitors, are quite com-
mon in the context of biologic drugs. This is not surprising in 
view of the large number of complex technologies used in the 
development and manufacturing of biologics, and the large 
number of patents covering these technologies and owned by 
dispersed parties. 
The threat of being sued for patent infringement after 
market entry is a simple reality that any biologic producer fac-
es, and that also applies to FOB producers. For a variety of rea-
sons, some of which were addressed in the FTC Report,138 it 
                                                          
 136. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 137. See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 30–31. 
 138. See id. at 59–60. 
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would be entirely impractical and unwise to attempt to force all 
third-party patent owners to identify patents that might be in-
fringed by an FOB, and to bring a lawsuit prior to the market-
ing approval of FOB. At the same time, it makes no sense to 
discriminate against biologic innovators by requiring them to 
bring suit early but not requiring the same of other third-party 
patent owners. Thus, any PPRP provisions enacted for biologics 
should not include any provisions that would seek to compel bi-
ologic innovators to identify potentially infringing patents, or to 
bring suit prior to FOB marketing approval or risk loss of pa-
tent rights. This would be consistent with the PPRP process 
currently available for conventional drug innovators, which 
contains no provision that would force an innovator to choose 
between bringing suit immediately or forfeiting the ability to 
obtain sufficient remedies for patent infringement later.139 
Not only are provisions compelling innovators to identify 
and assert patents prior to FOB marketing approval unneces-
sary, they also discriminate against biologic innovators com-
pared to conventional drug innovators. These provisions would 
dramatically weaken the patent rights of biologic innovators, 
which would result in reduced investment and innovation in bi-
ologics. 
A. HATCH-WAXMAN STRIVES TO BALANCE THE INTERESTS OF 
INNOVATORS AND GENERIC COMPANIES 
To better appreciate the harshness of some aspects of the 
PPRP provisions currently being considered by Congress, it is 
instructive to first consider the relatively balanced approach 
embodied in the Hatch-Waxman PPRP. Under Hatch-Waxman, 
an innovator marketing an approved conventional drug is re-
quired to list all of its patents that claim the drug, or a method 
of using the drug, in an FDA publication known as the Orange 
Book.140 The Orange Book listing requirement only applies to 
drugs regulated under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA),141 and thus does not apply to most biologic drugs, 
which are regulated under the Public Health Services Act 
(PHSA).142 Listing a patent in the Orange Book not only pro-
                                                          
 139. See id. at 49-50; see also Holman, Reverse Payments, supra note 25, at 
509–16 (2007) (explaining PPRP for conventional drugs under Hatch-
Waxman). 
 140. See id. at 49. 
 141. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300jj-38 (2006). 
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vides notice to potential generic competitors of the most rele-
vant patents, but also effectively puts a bounty on each of the 
listed patents, in the form of a 180-day period of generic exclu-
sivity that is granted to any generic company that challenges 
an Orange Book-listed patent by applying for approval to com-
mence marketing of the generic version prior to patent expira-
tion.143 The generic company must specifically allege that the 
challenged patent is invalid or would not be infringed by the 
company’s proposed generic product. During these 180 days, 
FDA will not authorize the marketing of any other generic ver-
sion of the drug, a boon for the generic company and a substan-
tial financial incentive for patent challenges. 
Orange Book listing also provides substantial benefit to the 
patent owner. FDA will not approve a generic version of a drug 
until all of the Orange Book-listed patents relating to the drug 
have expired, unless the generic applicant explicitly challenges 
a patent as described above. If a generic company does chal-
lenge an Orange Book-listed patent, Hatch-Waxman authorizes 
the patent owner to immediately file an infringement lawsuit 
before the proposed generic product has been approved for 
marketing. If suit is filed within forty-five days, the statute 
specifies that FDA will not approve the generic application for 
at least thirty months.144 In effect, Orange Book listing allows 
the patent owner to obtain an automatic preliminary injunction 
of at least thirty months, blocking generic market entry with-
out having to establish the reasonable expectation of success 
and other equitable factors normally necessary to convince a 
court to grant a preliminary injunction.145 Ideally, the thirty 
months provides the parties an opportunity to resolve patent 
issues prior to generic market entry. 
The benefits of Orange Book listing for innovators tend to 
balance other provisions of Hatch-Waxman that worked as a 
disadvantage, such as the regulatory approval exemption from 
patent infringement that permits generic companies to conduct 
the tests necessary to achieve FDA approval prior to the expi-
ration of the innovator’s patents. Another substantial benefit to 
generic companies is the abbreviated approval process which 
allows them to gain marketing approval based on data generat-
                                                          
 143. Holman, Reverse Payments, supra note 25, at 509–16 (2007). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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ed and submitted by the innovator, and also permits FDA to 
authorize pharmacists to substitute the generic drug for a 
branded drug prescribed by a physician. 
B. SOME OF THE PROPOSED PPRP PROVISIONS DEVIATE 
DRAMATICALLY FROM THE BALANCED APPROACH EMBODIED IN 
HATCH-WAXMAN 
In stark contrast with the balanced approach of Hatch-
Waxman, House Bill 1427 would create a PPRP weighted heav-
ily against the patent owner. Under House Bill 1427, any appli-
cant or prospective applicant for approval of an FOB would be 
authorized to demand from any innovator marketing an ap-
proved biologic a list of all patents owned, licensed or controlled 
by the innovator, that could potentially be infringed by a follow-
on product.146 This request could be made at any time, long be-
fore an FOB application is submitted, and even if an applica-
tion is never submitted.147 Not only would the innovator be re-
quired to identify patents claiming the biologic drug and 
methods of using it, but also components of the drug and 
processes that could be used to produce the product, regardless 
of whether or not the patented process is actually used in the 
production of the innovator’s product. In other words, the inno-
vator would not only be required to identify product-specific pa-
tents, but any patent covering a process or reagent which could 
conceivably be adapted for use in the production of a biosimilar 
product. To ensure innovator compliance, House Bill 1427 
would punish the failure to list any patent by rendering that 
patent unenforceable, not only against the FOB applicant but 
against the whole world.148 
Facing the draconian threat of patent unenforceability, and 
uncertainty as to the range of potential variation that would be 
permitted under the nebulous concept of “biosimilarity,” inno-
vators will likely feel compelled to err on the side of overinclu-
sion and list any patent that could conceivably be related to the 
production of a biosimilar product. Unfortunately for the inno-
vator, however, listing a patent will subject that patent to a 
number of provisions of House Bill 1427 that dramatically limit 
the rights of the patent owner. For example, once a patent has 
been identified in such a list, House Bill 1427 would bar the pa-
                                                          
 146. H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at § 3(b)(2). 
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tent owner from bringing a pre-marketing declaratory judg-
ment lawsuit against the FOB applicant, forcing the innovator 
to wait until the FOB has entered the market at risk before 
commencing a lawsuit for infringement.149 In the past, innova-
tors have used declaratory judgment actions to bring suit prior 
to market entry by the competitor. Such declaratory judgment 
actions provide patent owners an opportunity to plead their 
case before a court, and to obtain a preliminary injunction that 
prevents the competing product from being launched until the 
litigation is resolved. Importantly, a court will not issue a pre-
liminary injunction unless it is convinced that the patent owner 
is likely to prevail in its lawsuit, and that the public interest is 
not adversely affected by the injunction.150 By barring the in-
novator from bringing suit until after the FOB has entered the 
market at risk, House Bill 1427 substantially weakens the pa-
tent rights of the innovator. 
While innovators would be blocked from bringing a decla-
ratory judgment action with respect to any listed patent, House 
Bill 1427 explicitly authorizes an FOB applicant to bring a dec-
laratory judgment lawsuit alleging invalidity or noninfringe-
ment of any of the listed patents at any time.151 The bill would 
allow an FOB applicant to challenge any patent any time prior 
to approval and marketing, or to decide not to challenge any 
patent and enter the market at risk, while denying the patent 
owner any corresponding right to bring an action prior to mar-
ket entry. 
Not only does House Bill 1427 provide a unilateral right to 
an FOB applicant to bring a declaratory judgment action prior 
to marketing approval, it also provides an alternate mechanism 
for challenging a patent without bringing suit. Under the bill, 
an FOB applicant can, at any time, provide notice to the inno-
vator alleging that one or more of the innovators’ patents is ei-
ther invalid or would not be infringed by the FOB product.152 
                                                          
 149. Id. at § 3(a)(2). 
 150. Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 
(2008)) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) that 
he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips 
in his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.”) 
 151. Id. at § 3(a)(2). 
 152. Id. 
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The innovator would then have to bring in infringement suit 
within forty-five days.153 If a lawsuit is not filed in time, the in-
novator will be barred from asserting the patent in court until 
the FOB product is on the market. And as punishment for not 
bringing suit within the forty-five day window, House Bill 1427 
would forever limit the innovator’s remedy for patent infringe-
ment to reasonable royalty damages, even if the innovator ul-
timately prevails in court and proves that the FOB product in-
fringes a valid patent.154 The more potent remedies that are 
available to any other patent holder—a permanent injunction 
to prevent ongoing or impending infringement, lost profit dam-
ages to adequately compensate the innovator, and enhanced 
damages for willful infringement—would be unavailable for bi-
ologic innovators. In effect, failure to file suit within forty-five 
days would result in a compulsory license of the patent in favor 
of the FOB applicant. 
As alluded to in the FTC Report, in many cases forty-five 
days will be insufficient time for the patent owner to thorough-
ly assess the merits of a patent infringement suit.155 Com-
pounding the problem, there is nothing to prevent an FOB ap-
plicant from changing its production process, and consequently 
the nature of the product, after the forty-five days have ex-
pired.156 Thus, an innovator might decide not to bring suit 
within forty-five days because of its understanding of the pro-
posed product and process, but subsequent changes to the pro-
duction process could change the nature not only of the process 
but of the product itself, thereby rendering it infringing. Even 
so, the innovator’s remedies will be limited to reasonable royal-
ties as determined by a court, which will likely fall short of 
adequate compensation for the innovator. The FTC Report 
notes that FOB applicants would be incentivized to engage in 
this sort of gamesmanship.157 
House Bill 1427 also includes a change of venue provision 
that authorizes an FOB applicant that has been sued for patent 
infringement to request that the court transfer the action to 
another judicial district.158 This provision would only operate in 
one direction, since no complementary right is provided to in-
                                                          
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at § 3(b)(2). 
 155. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 52 n.219. 
 156. Id. at 55. 
 157. FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 54 n.225. 
 158. H.R. 1427, at § 3(b)(1). 
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novators to seek a change of venue in a declaratory judgment 
action filed by an FOB applicant. When considering a request 
for change of venue under the bill, the greatest weight would be 
placed on moving the case to a district court which will adjudi-
cate the matter promptly so that the FOB product can be 
launched as quickly as possible.159 Any other considerations 
would be secondary. By depriving innovators of any meaningful 
control over the venue in which to enforce their patent rights, 
the bill further weakens the patent rights of innovators relative 
to any other participants in the patent system. 
Unlike its predecessor, House Bill 1548,160 the PPRP provi-
sions of the House Amendment do not include such discrimina-
tory measures. To be sure, the House and Senate Amendments 
are largely similar and follow the same general structure. In 
both, the acceptance of a biologics license application for abbre-
viated approval triggers an obligation to provide reference 
product sponsors and certain patent owners with confidential 
access to the FOB application and information about the FOB 
manufacturing process.161 The burden of identifying relevant 
patents then falls largely on the reference product sponsor or 
the patent owner. Relevant patents include product and me-
thod-of-use patents with respect to which a claim of infringe-
ment could reasonably be asserted, as well as manufacturing 
and process patents and patents to biological starting materials 
and intermediates. Because the PPRP is tied to the submission 
of an FOB application, the earliest date under which litigation 
could commence under both Amendments is during year four 
after first licensure of the reference product.162 Before pre-
approval patent litigation can commence, the parties exchange 
detailed statements concerning the infringement, validity and 
enforceability of the identified patents. A statement by the FOB 
                                                          
 159. Id. 
 160. H.R. 1548, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 161. Note that House Bill 1427 follows a different pattern, which was dis-
cussed in more detail in previous sections of this paper. See H.R. 1427. This 
section focuses on what appears to be a developing consensus view, as embo-
died in House Bill 1548 and the recent House and Senate Amendments. See 
H.R. 1548. 
 162. The House and Senate Amendments, as well as House Bill 1548 and 
Senate Bill 1695, each provide that the earliest date on which an FOB applica-
tion may be submitted is on the fourth anniversary of the date the reference 
product was first licensed by FDA. See H.R. 1548, at § 101(a); S. 1695, 110th 
Cong. § 2(a) (as introduced in the Senate, June 26, 2007). 
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applicant that an identified patent would not be infringed, is 
invalid, or unenforceable, triggers a limited window within 
which the plaintiff can bring a patent infringement suit.163 Pa-
tent litigation that is concluded before data exclusivity expires, 
and that results in a finding of infringement, will operate to de-
lay the effective date of the FOB approval until the expiration 
of the infringed patent. Thus, on the simplest level, the House 
and Senate Amendments both contemplate that the submission 
of an FOB application would open a time window for patent lit-
igation long before the FOB application would be approved by 
the FDA, without the need for special stays of FDA approval 
pending litigation. Patents would be litigated to a final decision 
within this window, thus providing patent certainty for both 
parties and a date certain at which the FOB product could be 
launched. 
Despite these many similarities, the PPRP provisions of 
the Senate Amendment are also related to those provided in 
House Bill 1427, albeit not quite as draconian. Unlike the 
House Amendment, the Senate Amendment would limit an in-
novator to reasonable royalties for not promptly filing a lawsuit 
once an FOB applicant challenged the patent. It would also pu-
nish an innovator for failing to identify a relevant patent by 
rendering the patent unenforceable with respect to the biologi-
cal product at issue, which is at least an improvement over 
House Bill 1427, which would render the patent totally unen-
forceable against the world. Still, the threat is so severe that an 
innovator will be effectively compelled to list any patent that 
could conceivably be infringed by an FOB. 
These provisions clearly discriminate against biologic in-
novators. In no other area of technology is a patent owner re-
quired to identify patents that it thinks might be infringed, 
particularly with respect to a product that might still be 
changed prior to market entry. Patent owners are not ordinari-
ly compelled to choose between immediately bringing a lawsuit 
against a competitor, to say nothing of a potential competitor 
perhaps years from market entry, or being limited to reasona-
ble royalty damages (which, in effect, amount to a compulsory 
                                                          
 163. The Senate Amendment provides that this statement would constitute 
an “act of infringement” - the formal basis for bringing an infringement law-
suit. The House Amendment currently does not contain this necessary provi-
sion, possibly due to a technical omission. Note that this provision was proper-
ly included in House Bill 1548, the predecessor to the House Amendment. See 
H.R. 1548, at § 101(a). 
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license of the technology). Conventional drug innovators do not 
face this burden, nor do third-party patent owners who do not 
make the reference product but nonetheless have patents relat-
ing to the production of the FOB. In this sense, these provisions 
favor the non-practicing entity over the innovator who invests 
in bringing an actual product to market. This is inconsistent 
with the more general trend in patent law that favors parties 
who actually commercialize their patented technology over non-
practicing entities.164 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Any abbreviated approval pathway for FOBs should in-
clude a substantial data exclusivity period and a fair mechan-
ism for the early resolution of patent disputes. The pending 
proposals vary widely in many regards, including the patent 
provisions. Several of the proposals would impose unduly com-
plex procedures and exceedingly unfair burden and risk on bio-
tech innovators. This stands in contrast to the patent laws go-
verning all other technologies. Such an approach is also incon-
sistent with the relatively balanced mechanism adopted for the 
generic drug regime established by the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
is unwarranted in the biotechnology context where the chal-
lenges of getting a new medicine to patients are even greater. 
 
                                                          
 164. See EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
